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Abstract
Recently, the interactions between product market structure and labor market outcomes have come under in-
creased scrutiny. This paper considers the dynamic relationship between product market regulation and equilibrium
unemployment and wages, both theoretically and quantitatively. The main elements of our model are Mortensen-
Pissarides-style search and matching frictions, monopolistic competition in the goods market, multi-worker ﬁrms
and barriers to entry. Our measure of competition has a strong impact on equilibrium unemployment rates and on
equilibrium wages, indicating that product market competition does indeed have quantitatively signiﬁcant effects on
labor market outcomes. Most of the impact is achieved by moving from a monopoly to four to ﬁve competing ﬁrms
per industry. Hence, a little bit of competition goes a long way. Competition is then linked to a speciﬁc regulatory
institution, namely barriers to entry. Data on entry costs are used to compare labor market performance under two
regimes: a high-regulation European regime and a low-regulation Anglo-American one. When ﬁrms are short-lived,
greater European product market regulation can account for unemployment rates that are one to two full percentage
points greater than the corresponding Anglo-American values.
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A growing body of recent literature attempts to explain the divergent performance of European and US labor markets
during the 80’s and 90’s, a phenomenon which has become known as the ‘European Unemployment Puzzle’. Gener-
ally, the focus has been upon interactions of labor market institutions with other economic variables [cf. Ljungqvist
and Sargent (1998,2002), den Haan, Haefke, and Ramey, 2001] and upon hiring and ﬁring restrictions. However,
except for Pissarides (2001), little attention has been paid to one of the primary ways in which US and European
economies differ: the degree of product market regulation. To give an idea of the magnitudes involved, Figure 1
presents data on barriers to entry in the US and in the European Union, collected by Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de
Silanes and Shleifer (2002). The solid bars represent the time required to establish a standardized ﬁrm, ranging from
2 business days in Canada to a whopping 154 days in Austria. The population-weighted EU average of 88 days is
an order of magnitude larger than the corresponding North American ﬁgures. Djankov, et. al. also report the cost of
establishing a standardized ﬁrm in percent of per capita GDP of the respective country. Once again, the gulf between
the Anglo-American world and Europe is striking: establishing a ﬁrm in the US costs about 1% of per capita GDP,
while establishing the average EU ﬁrm costs 17% of per capita GDP. Once again, the European barriers to entry are
an order of magnitude larger. It seems reasonable that such large differences in product market competition might
translate into large differences in labor market outcomes.
Indeed, there is some empirical evidence to support the link between product market competition and job creation
rates. Bertrand and Kramarz (2001) examine the impact of the Loi Royer of 1974, which regulated entry into French
retailing. Betrand and Kramarz (2001) ﬁnd that those regions [departements] which restricted entry more strongly,
experienced slower rates of job growth. Boeri, Nicoletti and Scarpetta (2000), using an OECD index of the degree
of product market regulation, also report a negative relationship between their regulation measure and employment.
Moreover, the timing of US deregulation efforts, which began in the late 1970’s, ﬁts neatly into the picture of labor
market performance which began to diverge in the early 80’s. The most important pieces of US deregulation were put
into placein the late 70’s andearly 80’s. These measureswere accompaniedbyan overallpushto reduce“redtape”. In
contrast, European deregulation efforts are still incipient as of late 2002. Hence, product market deregulation is a sort
of smokinggunfor divergentUS and Europeanlabor marketperformance,whose implicationsare worthinvestigating.
Little previous theoretical work has analyzed whether and how product market rigidities may affect equilibrium
labor market outcomes. A notable exception is the seminal paper of Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002), who study labor
market outcomes in a model with monopolistic competition. In a very stylized setting, they ﬁnd that equilibrium
unemployment is decreasing and equilibrium wages are increasing in the degree of product market competition. In a
similar vein, Spector (2002) studies the effects of changes in the intensity of product market competition in a model
with capital and concludes that product-market and labor-market regulations tend to reinforce each other. All papers
in the literature so far consider static or two-period setups. We contribute to the product market/labor market debate
by specifying a fully dynamic matching model which we believe to be very well suited for the study of product- and
labor market issues. To this end we build on Blanchard and Giavazzi’s (2002) work, by extending their framework in
three key directions. First, we use a dynamic Mortensen-Pissarides-style labor matching setup to obtain equilibrium
2unemployment. This extension to a dynamic setting is necessary if we want to account for the typical structure of
long term employment relationships. It also makes our framework particularly well-suited to quantitative analysis - a
property which we will exploit. Secondly, we consider an alternative competition framework, based on Gal´ ı(1995).
Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002) consider increases in inter-industry competition. In contrast, we consider increases in
intra-industry competition, while still being able to vary industry-level market power. We then use the Djankov, et. al.
data on barriersto entryto determinethe degreeof intra-industrycompetitionendogenously 1. This competitionframe-
work turns out to be remarkably tractable and ﬂexible. This allows us to introduce heterogeneity across industries, in
order to examine the differential impact on employment and wages in high and low-technology industries.
In qualitativeterms, our results are quite similar to those of Blanchardand Giavazzi (2002). We coincide in ﬁnding
that greater degrees of product market competition lead to lower equilibrium unemployment and higher real wages.
One ofthe main contributionsof this paperis to answertwo quantitativequestions. First, byhowmuchdoes increasing
product market competition decrease unemployment? We examine this issue by varying our measure for competition
- the number of ﬁrms per industry - to assess the impact on key labor market variables. In our benchmark calibration,
unemployment falls dramatically, from more than 20% to 4.6%, while real wages nearly double when the number
of ﬁrms per industry is increased from one to four. Increasing the number of ﬁrms beyond four, however, has only
negligible impact on labor market variables. Hence we conclude: a little bit of competition goes a long way.
Next, we relate the degree of product market competition to a speciﬁc regulatory institution. In particular, we
focus on the impact of barriers to entry on competition. We use the data of Djankov, et. al. to deﬁne two regulatory
regimes: high-regulation continental European and low-regulation Anglo-American. This allows us to answer our
secondquantitativequestion: By howmuchwould reducingcontinentalEuropeanbarriers to entryto Anglo-American
levels reduce unemployment? We ﬁnd that both regimes lead to very large equilibrium industry sizes of more than
twenty ﬁrms, a range where variation in entry costs has only negligible effects on employment. This negative result
is, however, primarily due to the simplifying assumption of inﬁnitely-lived ﬁrms. When ﬁrms have shorter horizons,
entry costs may indeed play an important role for labor market outcomes.
Finally, we identify an interesting interaction between inter-industry and intra-industry competition. When
industry-levelmarketpoweris veryhigh,thenproﬁtsarerelativelyhighfora widerangeofindustrysizes, sothat barri-
ers to entrydorelativelylittle to deter entry,leadingto highdegreesofintra-industrycompetition. Whenindustry-level
marketpoweris low, however,proﬁtsarealso relativelylow, sothat thesame barrierstoentrymayindeedhaveastrong
detrimental effect on entry, leading to small industry sizes. Hence, it is precisely when intra-industry competition is
relatively stiff that barriers to entry may become important.
Theremainderofthepaperis organizedasfollows: Sections2and3presentthebasicmodel,whichischaracterized
by monopolistic competition in the goods market, search and matching in the labor market, multi-worker ﬁrms and
barriers to entry. Sections 4 and 5 focus on quantitative analysis. Section 4 addresses our ﬁrst quantitative question
by relating industry size to labor and product market equilibria. Section 5 examines the impact of entry costs on
equilibrium industry size, allowing us to address our second quantitative question. Section 6 extends the model to
1In specifying the entry cost to the market our approach is related to that of Pissarides (2001).
3consider heterogeneous technologies and alternative competition and bargaining frameworks. Section 7 concludes.
2 The Basic Model
In this section we present the basic model. Its main elements are monopolistic competition in the goods market
and Mortensen/Pissarides-style matching with multi-worker ﬁrms in the labor market. In the Mortensen-Pissarides
framework, equilibrium unemployment is well micro-founded, allowing us to draw a precise link between the degree
of competition in the goods market and the equilibrium level of unemployment. In addition, we will also be able to
characterize the behavior of wages and proﬁts as a function of the degree of competition.
2.1 Households
2.1.1 Search and Matching in the Labor Market
Thelabormarketischaracterizedbyastandardsearchandmatchingframework. Unemployedworkersuandvacancies
v are converted into matches by a constant returns to scale matching function m(u,v)=u ηv1−η. Deﬁning labor
market tightness as θ ≡ v
u, the ﬁrm meets unemployed workers at rate q (θ)=θ−η, while the unemployed workers
meet vacancies at rate θq(θ)=θ1−η. Matches are destroyed at the exogenous rate χ.
Inthebasic model,ﬁrms arehomogeneousso thatall jobs areidentical2. Foreachworker,the valueofemployment
is given by V E, which satisﬁes:
rV






where χ is the separation rate. Hence, the asset value of employment is equal to the period nominal wage w, minus
the capital loss due to unemployment. The value of unemployment is the same for all workers:
rV U = bP + θq(θ)

V E − V U
(2)
where P denotes the aggregate price level and b real unemployment beneﬁts.
2.1.2 Monopolistic Competition in the Goods Market
Households are both consumers and workers. As risk-neutral consumers, they have Dixit-Stiglitz preferences over a














P di where In denotes real income of household n. In order to focus the
dynamics on the labor market, there is no saving. This is a standard monopolistic-competitionsetting, which leads to














with elasticity of substitution between differentiated goods given by −σ.
2.2 Modeling Competition
In principle, there are two ways in which greater competition may manifest itself: as greater competition within
existing industries or as greater competition among industries. The latter would lead to an industry-level decrease in
market power, which implies an increase in the elasticity of substitution among goods σ, leading us to denote greater
competition among industries as an increase in σ−competition. However, it is often argued that σ is a preference
parameter rather than a measure of competition. We address this concern in the basic model by treating σ a saﬁ x e d
preference parameter which determines how willing consumers are to substitute among differentiated goods. We
will not rely on σ to model differing degrees of competition. Rather, we follow Gal´ ı(1995) in assuming that each
differentiated good i is produced by an industry populated by n i ﬁrms. An increase in the number of ﬁrms in each
industry leads to an increase in the degree of competition within each industry. In the main model we will focus on
increases in such intra-industry competition, which we call n−competition3.
The ﬁrms within each industry compete by Cournot4. Under Cournot competition, ﬁrm j in industry i has output
Yij which satisﬁes:
Y(i) = Yij +( ni − 1)Y i,−j, (5)





























When ﬁrms within an industry are symmetric, each ﬁrm faces a demand elasticity which depends only on the total
number of ﬁrms present in the industry:
ξi = niσ. (8)
In the basic model we will assume symmetric ﬁrms. In what follows we will label ﬁrms only by their industry 5 i.
The n−competition approach turns out to be very ﬂexible and tractable. Equations (7) and (8) make clear that
incorporating either heterogeneous ﬁrms within an industry or industries of heterogeneous size will affect demand
elasticity in a straightforward way. Later, we will exploit this ﬂexibility to examine the effects of heterogeneity across
industries.
3We will examine σ−competition in the extensions.
4In the basic model, we focus on the collusion-free equilibrium of the dynamic Cournot game. Collusive equilibria would involve even greater
output restriction, which would strengthen our results. We will return to the subject of collusive equilibria in section 5.
5To avoid confusion, we denote aggregate demand facing industry i by YD
i , while industry i’s aggregate output is denoted Y (i) and the output
of an individual ﬁrm in industry i is denoted Yi.
52.3 Multiple-worker Firms
The standard Mortensen-Pissaridessetup assumes one-workerﬁrms. Under perfect competition in goods markets, this
assumption is harmless, since the number and size of ﬁrms is indeterminateanyway. Under monopolistic competition,
however, ﬁrms react to downward sloping demand by restricting output. With given technology and capital, the only
way to vary output is to vary the amount of labor employed (either on the intensive margin as in Walsh (2002) or
on the extensive margin as in our model). Hence, in order to make varying degrees of competition meaningful, it is
necessary to provideﬁrms with some margin of adjustment. Consistent with stylized facts we assume that ﬁrms adjust
employment by varying the number of workers rather than the number of hours 6. In fact, in our model the number of
workers employed is determined endogenously, as a function of the elasticity of demand ξ i.
Firms maximize the discounted value of future proﬁts. The ﬁrm’s key decision is the number of vacancies. Firms
open as many vacancies as necessary to hire in expectation the desired number of workers, while taking into account
that the real cost to opening a vacancy is ΦV . In such a setup the vacancy posting cost of the one-worker ﬁrm turns
into a linear hiring cost. Firm i’s state variable is the number of workers currently employed,H i, which may of course
differ from the number of workers desired for the next period H  
i. The ﬁrm’s problem becomes:




















production function: Yi = AHi
transition function: H 
i =( 1− χ)Hi + q (θ)vi
where in the symmetric Cournot equilibrium ξi = niσ, as described above. Although the multi-worker ﬁrm problem









By (10), thevalueofthemarginalworkeris equalforall ﬁrms, sinceits equilibriumvalueonlydependsuponaggregate
variables. That is, the marginalvalue of an additionalworkermust equal the cost of searchingfor him/her,which is not
ﬁrm-speciﬁc. In addition, the fact that all ﬁrms face the same linear vacancy-posting cost ensures that the equilibrium
value of the marginal worker be independent of ﬁrm size Hi. Both of these properties help keep this model tractable.
Combining (10) with the envelope condition, using the deﬁnition of demand elasticity (7) and rearranging, yields



















Firms price their goods by taking a constant markup
ξi
ξi−1 on the marginal cost of producing the good. The mark-up
is decreasing in the demand elasticity faced by the ﬁrm. The marginal cost of the good is the marginal cost of labor
6It is important to realize that in our model the standard equivalence between one-worker and multi-worker ﬁrms does not hold.
6(the term in curly brackets) scaled by the ﬁrm’s productivity A. In the labor-matching setup the marginal cost of labor
has three terms: the unit labor cost
w(Hi)
P , the search cost ΦV
q(θ) [r + χ], and the effect on the wage from hiring another
worker Hi
∂[w(Hi)/P]
∂Hi . The ﬁnal term reﬂects ﬁrms’ anticipation that the result of wage bargaining will depend upon
the number of workers hired. In addition, it is useful to note that (11) is an implicit labor demand curve which relates
the ﬁrm’s optimal employment choice to the wage.
2.4 Bargaining
In this section we generate wage curves and and complete the description of labor demand. In the basic model,
we consider individual bargaining, based on Stole and Zwiebel (1996), and Cahuc and Wasmer (2001). By its very
nature, individual bargaining involves bargaining over wages only. In contrast, in the collective efﬁcient bargaining
framework considered in Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002), workers and ﬁrms bargain over wages, employment and
prices. In Section 6.3, we will also compare our results to those derived under efﬁcient bargaining.
We rely on the structure provided by Stole and Zwiebel (1996b). The key assumption is that ﬁrms engage in
pairwise negotiations with workers. If a worker leaves or joins the ﬁrm, resulting in a change in ﬁrm size, then all
existing agreements become void, and pairwise negotiations begin anew with each member of the workforce. Within
each bilateral bargain, this process can be understood as an alternate offer game (Binmore et al. 1986). Hence the
result that we obtain for the wage curve in (15) can be obtained either by fully modeling the pairwise bargaining
structure, or by solving a standard generalized Nash bargaining problem 7.
Here we take the shortcut via Nash. The standard Nash bargainingproblem is given by max w

V E(w) − V Uβ
+

V J(w) − V V 1−β
where β stands for the bargaining weight of the workers. In the multi-worker ﬁrm context the
ﬁrm’s outside option is not entering the vacancy pool, but rather working with one worker less. This can be im-
plemented in two ways, either by V J(Hi) − V J(Hi − 1) or by taking the derivative of V J with respect to Hi and
considering this to be the contribution of the marginal worker. Following Cahuc and Wasmer (2001) we will use the
latter approach, as it is consistent with the assumption of a continuum of worker/consumers. Hence, the multi-worker











To obtain an expression for ﬁrm’s surplus, take the envelope condition of the ﬁrm’s problem ( 9), and recall that the
ﬁrst order condition (10) implies that ∂V
J















The worker’s side is standard:
V E
i − V U =
wi − rV U
r + χ
, (14)
so that the reservation wage is given by the asset value of unemployment rV U.
7See appendix A for an intuitive discussion.
8For constant union-membership and marginal VJ equal average V J this would be equivalent to a right-to-manage setup.









Substituting in the expressions for worker’s and ﬁrm’s surplus (13) and (14) leads to a ﬁrst-order linear differential
equation in the wage.


















Equation (15) is the wage curve for ﬁrm i. The impact of monopolistic competition is captured in two ways. First, the
coefﬁcient β
ξi−1
ξi−β represents the share of marginal revenue product which goes to workers. As competition increases,
the worker’s share of MRP also increases, shifting the wage curve up. However, ξ i also determines the size of the
MRP. As competition increases, the MRP shrinks, shifting the curve back down. The total impact is akin to gaining
an increasing share of a shrinking pie.
Also, note that the wage curve is actually downward sloping: as the number of workers per ﬁrm increases, the
















We proceed to ﬁnd equilibrium in three steps. First, we focus on ﬁrm-level behavior, by identifying the ﬁrm’s optimal
employment-wage pair when it takes aggregate variables as given. Then, we go on to ﬁnd the quantities and prices
which are consistent with market clearing. This will allow us to obtain expressions for all equilibrium variables as
functions of the exogenous degree of competition. We call this second stage short-run general equilibrium. In Section
5 we will introduce entry costs, which will serve to endogenize the degree of competition. This last equilibrium will
be referred to as long-run general equilibrium.
3.1 Firm-Level Equilibrium
First, we focus on the ﬁrm’s optimal choices, taking aggregate variables as given. We already have a labor supply
equation, the wage curve (15), which was derived from the wage bargaining. An expression for labor demand may be














[r + χ] (17)
Equation (17) can also be interpreted as a job creation condition. As expected, it is downward sloping, both in the
amount of labor demanded Hi and in labor market tightness θ.
8Optimal employment for ﬁrm i may be computed implicitly as the intersection of the job creation condition ( 17)


















Equation (18) expresses the price as a markup over the good’s equilibrium marginal cost (the term in parentheses),
scaled by the ﬁrm’s technology A. The marginal cost consists of the reservation wage plus a term which accounts
for hiring costs. As expected, the markup is decreasing in competition ξ i. We can compute optimal employment by
combining (18) with the demand curve facing ﬁrm i (4) and solving for employment Hi conditional on aggregate















Aσ−1I − (ni − 1) ¯ Hi,−j (19)
where ¯ Hi,−j is the average employment of competing ﬁrms within industry i. All other things equal, equation ( 19)
makes it clear that partial equilibrium employment is increasing in competition ξ i. This goes back to ﬁrst principles:
ﬁrms wish to react to increased demand elasticity by increasing output and hence employment. Equation ( 19) also
has the expected implication that higher unemployment beneﬁts and higher vacancy posting costs lead to smaller ﬁrm
size. Also, an increase in labor market tightness reduces ﬁrm size. Higher tightness means a smaller probability for a
ﬁrm to ﬁnd a worker, and hence higher overall hiring costs to ﬁll an open position.











(r + χ). (20)
In equilibrium, wages are equalized across jobs and across ﬁrms. As is standard in multiple-worker ﬁrm models [cf.
Pissarides (2001)], the reason is that all workers have identical outside options, and that hiring costs are linear and








[r + χ + θq(θ)] (21)
Note that althoughwages do not dependexplicitly ondemandelasticity ξ i, wages do dependon competitionindirectly,
via equilibrium labor market tightness θ.
Figure 2 illustrates the partial equilibrium graphically in the wages-employment space. Optimal employment H i
is found at the intersection of the job creation curve (17) and the wage curve (15), where the demand facing ﬁrm i (19)
has been substituted into both equations. The corresponding wage is that expressed by equation ( 21).
3.2 Short Run General Equilibrium
We distinguish between two kinds of economy-wide equilibria. First, we determine the ‘short-run’ general equilib-
rium, taking as given the number of ﬁrms present in each industry. In our setting, this is equivalent to pinning down
all equilibrium variables as functions of the degree of competition ξ. This will allow us to determine the impact of
9In Section 6, we will show that equilibrium wages will still be equalized across ﬁrms and industries, even when we allow for heterogeneity.
9increasing competition on equilibrium unemployment and wages. In section 5, we will determine the ‘long-run’equi-
librium, in which free entry also determines the number of ﬁrms present in each industry, and hence the equilibrium
degree of product market competition.
The most economically accessible way to obtain the short-term general equilibrium condition would be to take the









Hidf (i)+Φ V v (22)
where Equation (22) simply states that aggregate income is equal to the sum of all wages and proﬁts. However, we





















When the economy approaches full competition, (24) reduces to the standard condition A ≥ b that workers’ produc-
tivity be greater in employment than in unemployment.
Equation(23)is key,sinceit relatesthe degreeofcompetitionξ andequilibriumlabormarkettightnessθ. Imposing
the symmetric Cournot equilibrium in each industry, so that ξ = nσ, allows us to determine the equilibrium as a
function of industry size n. To emphasize this point, we will begin to express all equilibrium values as functions of n.
Once we have θ(n), we can obtain the equilibrium unemployment rate from the Beveridge curve:
u(n)=
χ
χ + θ (n)q [θ(n)]
(25)
It is straightforward to check that increasing our measure of competition - the number of ﬁrms per industry n - will
lead to increased labor market tightness and to decreased unemployment. In addition, an increase in either vacancy
posting costs ΦV or unemployment compensation b reduces equilibrium labor market tightness, thereby increasing
equilibrium unemployment. This is consistent with more conventional Mortensen-Pissarides style models. The effect
of the bargaining power β is ambiguous.
Substituting (23) back into (21) allows us to ﬁnd the equilibrium wage w(n). Interestingly, the equilibrium wage
turns out to be increasing in competition. This conclusion is the opposite of that drawn by the recent literature on
wages and the sharing of monopoly rents (cf. van Reenen, 1996). The source of the disparity is that the rent-sharing
papers typically look at only one isolated industry, while we consider broader increases in competition which affect
all industries at once. The general equilibrium effect of greater competition is to increase vacancies in all sectors,
making it easier for unemployed workers to ﬁnd new jobs. This increases the value of the worker’s outside option,
therebyimprovingtheworker’sbargainingpositionandincreasinghis/herwage. Thissearchchannelofwageincreases
turns out to outweigh the diminishing monopoly-rent channel of wage decreases, so that the sum effect of increasing
competition on wages is positive.
10The remainder of equilibrium variables are found as follows: Given the total number of agents in the economy N,
we can ﬁnd equilibrium aggregate employment as H (n)=N [1 − u(n)]. With H (n) in hand, we can ﬁnd aggregate
outputand subsequentlythe equilibriumquantityof goodi, and of course ﬁrm level employmentH i (n), outputYi (n)
and price Pi (n), all in terms of the degree of n−competition. It will also be useful to ﬁnd ﬁrm i’s equilibrium proﬁts
πi (n).
4 Competition, Wages and Employment
We are now in a position to approach our ﬁrst quantitative question: What is the impact of increasing n−competition
on equilibrium employment and wages? Having found the equilibrium as a function of our competition measure n in
the previous section, it remains to give sensible values to all parameters and then proceed to examine the impact of
varying n on equilibrium employment and wages.
One model period is calibrated to correspond to one month. For simplicity, we normalize the average level of
technology ¯ A to unity. Our choices for the interest rate r, unemploymentbeneﬁts b and separation rate χ are standard.
The latter implies that average job tenure be about 7 years. The baseline parameters are given in Table 1.
Many recent papers report estimates for bargaining power β in the range of 20%, among other Cahuc, Gianella,
Goux and Zylberberg (2002). We report results for a benchmark speciﬁcation of 20% as well as for β =5 0 %.
Standard values for labor market tightness are around two to ﬁve percent. However, these measure actual vacan-
cies over unemployment. The vacancies in our model should be consideredas the number of job interviews that a ﬁrm
undertakes in order to ﬁll one ‘regular’ vacancy. Furthermore ﬁrms adjust the number of interviews for the likelihood
of ﬁnding a suitable candidate. Hence we should adjust the standard notion of vacancies by the probability of being
matched with a worker. Doing so yields a value for the matching elasticity of around η =0 .25.
We set hiring costs ΦV so that equilibriumunemploymentin the fullycompetitivebaseline economy[withn>20
ﬁrms] is about 4.0%. We consider three values for the degree of substitutability among goods σ, ranging from 1.5 to
5.0. In addition, we examine low and high unemployment beneﬁt levels of 0.20 and 0.40.
Figure 3 presents the results of the baseline calibration. Figure 3a plots the equilibrium unemployment rate u
against the number of ﬁrms per industry, our measure of competition. As intra-industry competition increases, the
unemploymentrate decreases. At low levels of substitutability [σ =1 .5], the impact of competitionon unemployment
is quite dramatic. By increasing the number of ﬁrms per industry from one to four, equilibrium unemployment is
more than halved from 29.4% to about 4.6%. The decrease in unemployment can be attributed [via the Beveridge
curve] to the increase in labor market tightness depicted in Figure 3b. Hence, the decrease in unemployment can be
traced to the expansionaryeffect that competition has on vacancies. We identify two channels by which an increase in
n−competition affects vacancies: (1) the output-expansionchannel and (2) the wage-bargainingchannel. The output-
expansion channel is that already identiﬁed by Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002). When competition increases, ﬁrms
facing more elastic demand respond by increasing output, leading to an increase in employment. The second channel
is related to the properties of individual Nash bargainingover wages of our setting. Under individual bargaining,ﬁrms
11facing imperfectly elastic demand engage in over-hiring10. As competition increases, the over-hiring is diminished,
placing downward pressure on employment. Our results indicate that the ﬁrst effect prevails quite clearly, so that
steady-state employment is indeed found to be increasing with competition. Steady-state employment is proportional
to vacancies [by vi =
χHi
q(θ)], so that increased competition leads to increased vacancies v.
The impact of n−competition on equilibrium wages and proﬁts is equally striking. Figures 3c and 3d show that
equilibrium wages nearly double when the numberof ﬁrms is increased from 1 to 4, while per-ﬁrm equilibrium proﬁts
drop to about 1/5th of their monopoly levels. That wages are increasing despite shrinking proﬁts may seem surprising
initially. It is useful to recall, however, that the equilibrium wage is the sum of two components: a share β of match
surplus and the value of the worker’s outside option. Figures 3e and 3f depict the behaviorof each wage componentas
a functionof n. Greater n−competitionlead to higherequilibriumlabormarket tightness, so that unemployedworkers
ﬁnd it easier to ﬁnd a new job, raising the equilibrium value of unemployment - or equivalently the worker’s outside
option - which leads to an increase in the equilibrium wage. Although equilibrium match surplus increases slightly as
well, it is this improvement in the worker’s bargaining position which accounts for the vast majority of the increase
in wages due to competition. Interestingly, this indicates that the puzzling combination of stagnant wages and high
proﬁts currently observed in Germany, may simply be consistent with low degrees of competition and/or high degrees
of cartelization.
At moderate levels of substitutability among goods [σ =3 .0], the results are still striking, as demonstrated by
Figure 4: increasing the number of ﬁrms per industry from one to ﬁve causes equilibrium unemployment to decrease
by more than 30%, from 5.8% to 3.9%. Also, workers continue to beneﬁt from the improved labor market conditions
in wage terms as well, as they see real wages increase by nearly 50%. Once again the main source of wage increases
is the worker’s improved ability to ﬁnd jobs when unemployed, improving his or her bargaining position.
Figures 5 to 8 show the impact of increasing competition on employment for several other scenarios. Figure 5
shows that unemployment reacts even more sharply to an increase in competition when unemployment beneﬁts take
their high value of 0.4, while their weaker reaction at low beneﬁt levels of 0.20 is depicted in Figure 6. Figure 7 shows
the impact of increasing worker’s bargaining power to β =0 .50. Finally, Figure 8 exhibits labor market performance
for moderate levels of substitutability σ =3 .0 and high beneﬁts b =0 .40. Now, increasing the number of ﬁrms
from one to four causes unemployment to drop from about 7.5% to 4.6%, a decline of nearly 40%. Hence, even at
moderate degrees of substitutability among goods, increasing competition could have a substantial impact on both
unemployment and wages.
In all parameter scenarios the quantitative message is clear: A little bit of competition goes a long way. The main
beneﬁts to competition for employment and wages are due to the transition between monopoly and oligopoly, not to
the transition from oligopoly to perfect competition. Our results would be even stronger in the presence of collusion.
A collusive equilibrium involves two or more ﬁrms acting as if they were one - leading to an effective ﬁrm size of one,
and the resulting labor market implications. Hence, to the extent that small industry sizes makes collusion more likely,
an increase from moderate to large industry sizes could also be beneﬁcial for employment and wages.
10This is analogous to the results of Stole and Zwiebel (1996).
125 Barriers to Entry
In this section, we turn to our second quantitative question: By how much would lowering barriers to entry reduce
unemployment? We approach this issue by ﬁrst noting that introducing barriers to entry allows us to determine equi-
librium industry size n∗ endogenously. This forges a link between barriers to entry found in the data and equilibrium
n−competition. We then use the results of the previous section to connect n∗ to unemployment. This allows us
to assess the impact of higher continental European barriers to entry on labor market performance, by comparing
equilibrium unemployment to that under lower Anglo-American barriers to entry.
5.1 “Free Entry”
In order to enter the industry, ﬁrms must pay an entry cost ΦE. Entry by ﬁrms will continue until proﬁts net of entry
costs within each industry have been competed down to zero. Hence, free entry in the presence of barriers to entry














Hi (n) − vi (n)Φ v (27)
The free entry condition (26) states that the entry cost must be amortized by proﬁts over the ﬁrm’s inﬁnite lifespan.
Since equilibrium proﬁts depend upon the degree of competition, free entry forges a negative link between barriers to
entry and the number of ﬁrms. With the number of ﬁrms in hand, we can use the results of sections 3 and 4 to assess
the impact of given levels of entry costs on equilibrium labor market performance.
5.2 European and U.S. Data on Entry Costs
The purpose of this subsection is to use the data on barriers to entry collected by Djankov, et. al. to calibrate the entry
costs ΦE. Djankov, et.al. give entry costs in two complementary forms: as the number of business days d it takes
to setup the standardized ﬁrm, and as the percentage of per-capita GDP f required to pay the fees associated with
setting up the standardized ﬁrm. Table 2 divides OECD countries into two groups. The Anglo-American countries are
characterizedby low entrycosts, both in terms of fees and waiting periods. In contrast, the continentalEuropeangroup
has much higher barriers to entry, which are greater by an order of magnitude. Continental European countries must
wait an average of 88 days and pay fees of 17 percent of per capita GDP, compared to the corresponding population-
weighted average for the Anglo-American group of 7 days and only 1 percent of per capita GDP in fees.
Djankov, et. al.’s deﬁnition of entry costs is quite conservative: their standardized ﬁrms are locally-owned[i.e. not
subjecttojointventureapproval],donotengageinimportorexport[obviatingimportorexportlicensingrequirements]
and are not subject to any industry-speciﬁchealth, safety or environmentalregulation. Since a good part of any sample
13of ﬁrms is likely to be affected by at least one of these additional regulatory burdens, we must view Djankov et. al.’s
data as posing a lower boundon entry costs. Also, the data on fees refers only to ofﬁcial fees, and does not include any
lawyer’s, accountant’s or consultancy fees. As the entry process becomes more complex, it is reasonable to assume
that entrepreneurs may need to engage such professional services, further pushing up the entry cost.
In order to use Djankov, et. al.’s data to calibrate our model, we combine the fee and waiting period measures to
obtain a single quantiﬁcation of barriers to entry11. The most straightforward method is to convert the waiting period
into a pecuniary opportunity cost consisting of lost proﬁts during the setup-period, plus the lost wages of one person
who is charged with setting up the ﬁrm. This implies that a day of waiting is more costly in a high-proﬁt and/or
high-wage economy. Formally, we ﬁnd the real cost of entry delay by multiplying d by the sum of monthly proﬁts π
P
and monthly wages w
P , and then dividing by the average number of business days in a month, 20.8. 12. Total barriers to


































5.3 Barriers to Entry and Unemployment
We now consider two entry-cost regimes. The ﬁrst is a long-waiting period, high-fee regime, which we call ‘conti-
nental Europe’. dEuro is obtained as the population-weighted average of the time it takes to establish a standardized
ﬁrm in Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain, while f Euro is the
corresponding average for the fee-based entry costs. The second regime, which we call ‘Anglo-American’, is charac-
terized by short waiting periods and low fees. dAnglo is obtained as the population-weighted average of the delay for
the United States, United Kingdom, Ireland and Canada, while fAnglo is the correspondingﬁgure for fees. Both (f,d)
pairs are reported in Table 2.
In our basic setup, ﬁrms live forever. Hence, the entry costs can be amortized over the entire inﬁnite ﬁrm lifespan,
and then compared to per-period proﬁts. Hence, entry costs must be very large in order to have a signiﬁcant impact.
When ﬁrms live forever, we ﬁnd that both entry cost regimes lead to very large equilibrium industry sizes, as reported
in Table 3. In both the Anglo-American and the continental European regimes industry size is greater than 20 in the
baseline scenario, putting both model economies far in the ﬂat part of the unemployment-competitionschedule. This
is illustrated in Figure 9 neither the European nor the Anglo entry-cost schedule meets the proﬁt schedule at industry
sizes up to 20. Hence, despite the striking differencesin barriersto entry in Anglo-Americanand continentalEuropean
economies, the differences in equilibrium labor market behavior of inﬁnitely-lived ﬁrms is negligible.
11Pissarides (2001) instead captures the waiting period by a random probability of being granted the permission to open an establishment. In an
interesting extension he then suggests this probability could be reduced by bribes.
12The equivalent annual calibration would involve multiplying d by annual proﬁts π
P and then dividing by the 250 business days in a year.
14This negative result is due primarily to the strong assumption of inﬁnitely-lived ﬁrms. It is well-known that ﬁrm
exit rates are high. The picture improves considerably if we consider shorter-lived ﬁrms, who must amortize entry
costs over a shorter timespan. We attempt to capture the effects of shorter ﬁrm lifespans in a back-of-the-envelopeway
by introducing a constant per-period probability of ﬁrm survival p.
To ﬁnd reasonable values p, we consult the extensive literature concerned with ﬁrm survival rates. The one-year
probabilityof ﬁrm survivalvaries betweenabout0.70and 0.85,which correspondsto monthlyprobabilitiesof survival
between 0.970and 0.987. Dunne, Roberts and Samuelson(1988)examineseveral cohortsof U.S. manufacturingﬁrms
born between 1963 and 1977, and ﬁnd 5-year survival rates averaging 0.387, which correspond to a constant monthly
survival probability of 0.984. More recently, using a census of Portuguese manufacturing ﬁrms born in 1983, Mata
and Portugal (1994) ﬁnd a one-year survival rate of 0.776 and a four-year survival rate of 0.520, which corresponds to
constant monthly rates of 0.979 and 0.986 respectively. Data collected by Wagner (1994) for manufacturing ﬁrms in
the Lower Saxony region of Germany points to somewhat higher values near 0.99.
Several factors lead us to believe that ﬁrm survival rates may be even lower than those cited above. First, Mata
and Portugal (1994) report that ﬁrm survival rates are increasing in initial ﬁrm size - and note that their dataset is
likely to be underreporting the number of smallest ﬁrms with less than 5 employees. For example, Mata and Portugal
report a one-year survival rate of ﬁrms with one to two workers of only 0.7045, compared to 0.9545 for ﬁrms with
one hundred or more workers. Second, all datasets in the cited studies are composed exclusively of manufacturing
ﬁrms. andthere is reasonto believethat non-manufacturingﬁrms may havelower survivalrates. Audretsch(1991)and
Mata and Portugal (1994) report wide variation in ﬁrm survival rates across industries. Interestingly, the Portuguese
industries with the lowest four-year survival rates were ﬁsh-preserving [0.250], pastry [0.347] and made-to-measure
clothing [0.379]. All three are soft, workshop-style, labor-intensive industries, which are likely to share common
characteristics with service-industries,and may be indicative of lower non-manufacturingsurvival rates. Perhaps most
worryingly, Dunne, Robert and Samuelson (1988) note that most datasets do not differentiate between truly new ﬁrms
and new plants of existing ﬁrms. Since the latter are likely to have somewhat greater survival rates, the survival rates
of truly new ﬁrms may be overstated by undifferentiated datasets. Finally, all existing studies use data from the 80’s,
70’s or even 60’s, leaving open the possibility that increased ﬁrm entry rates in the 90’s may have been coupled with
increased exit rates.
Guided by the empirical estimates and the concerns cited above, we examine the impact of monthly ﬁrm-survival
rates ranging from 0.99 to 0.95. Since we are trying to assess the impact of a reduction in European entry costs,
we choose the scenario most appropriate to Europe: high beneﬁts and moderate degrees of substitution elasticity 13
σ =3 .0. Table 3 presents the results: we ﬁnd that equilibrium industry size - and thus labor market performance -
is quite sensitive to the ﬁrm survival rates. At the survival rates consistent with the data of 0.98 monthly, equilibrium
unemployment is 10% lower in the Anglo regime than in the European one, while the still plausible value of 0.97
yields a 17% decrease in equilibrium unemployment, from 5.18 % to 4.28%. The wage increase due to the shift to the
13Actually, equilibrium industry sizes are smaller for higher degrees of substitutability σ. The reason is that higher values of σ lead to lower
overall levels of proﬁts, so that the proﬁts and entry costs reach similar levels at smaller industry size.
15Anglo entry-cost regime is equally substantial, 7% and 14% respectively.
As encouragingas these results are, we shouldemphasizethat these ﬁgures fall short of providingfullysatisfactory
estimates of the impact of shorter ﬁrm lifespan. The reason is that steady-state ﬁrm entry and exit are not explicitly
modeled here. Since incorporating ﬁrm exit and entry will have an effect on both the job creation and the job destruc-
tion margin, the net effect is likely to be small. Hence, although our estimates are rough, they are unlikely to be biased
strongly in either direction.
6 Extensions
6.1 Heterogeneous Technologies
We extend the basic model to allow for heterogeneoustechnologies. We do this by allowing the technologyA i to vary
across industries, allowing us to assess the differential impact of an increase in competition on employment in high-
and low-technologysectors. This extension is quite straightforward. The ﬁrm’s problem remains identical, except that
the production function for industry i becomes:
Yi = AiHi.
Workers take into account that they may be matched to ﬁrms in low or high technology industries, which may in
principle lead to industry-speciﬁc wages wi, so that values of employment and unemployment are given by:
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i dν (i) and ν is the distribution of vacancies across industries. Since the separation probability is
constant and equal for all industries by assumption, the distribution of vacancies and the distribution of technologies
will be identical. Working through the ﬁrm-level equilibrium, it is straightforward to conﬁrm that the ﬁrm-level
equilibrium wage is independent of the technology, so that all industries pay identical wages which are described by









Differentiating (30) and (31) makes it clear that both ∂Yi
∂ξi and ∂Yi
∂ξi are increasing in Ai, so that competition-induced
output and employment expansion are strongest in high-technology sectors. The wage gains, however, are spread
equally across high and low-technology sectors.
In addition, employment and output levels are increasing in technology, so that by ( 27), proﬁts are also increasing
in technology. Since the overall level of proﬁts is greater in high-technologysectors, the same level of barriers to entry
leads to larger industry sizes - involving greater degrees of intra-industry competition - in the high technology sectors.
166.2 σ−Competition
As mentioned earlier, there are two ways in which greater competition may manifest itself: as greater competition
within existing industries or as greater competition among industries. Until now, we have been considering the impact
of an increase in intra-industry competition. Now, we shift the focus to inter-industry competition. As is usual in
the monopolistic competition, we will assume implicitly that each good is produced by a monopolist. An increase in
competition is assumed to lead to an a decrease in the market power of each monopolist, which leads to an increase in
the elasticity of substitution among goods σ. Hence, we call this competition setup σ−competition. 14
Adapting the basic model to take σ−competition into account is very straightforward. The main difference is that
the demand elasticity faced by each ﬁrm reduces to ξi = σ, since all ﬁrms are monopolists. Substituting in for ξi
everywhere leads to the analog of crucial equation for equilibrium labor market tightness ( 23), which will lead us to
an expression θ(σ). Accordingly, all equilibrium variables are now expressed as functions of σ rather than industry






Figure 11 shows how labor market variables adjust to differing levels of σ−competition. The results are strikingly
similar to those under n−competition. This is not surprising, since the differences in the equilibrium equations are
minimal. An increase in demand elasticity from 1.5 to 4.0 would decrease equilibrium unemployment from 29.4% to
5.01%, while also nearly doubling wages from 0.34 to 0.69. The main difference lies in the impact of barriers to entry
on industry size. When barriers to entry from the Djankov, et. al. data are used to calibrate the model, in none of the
scenarios are values of σ∗ smaller than 20. This implies that barriers to entry have only a negligible effect on the labor
market, even when allowing for shorter-lived ﬁrms.
6.3 Efﬁcient Bargaining
As an alternative to individualwage bargainingwe consider efﬁcient bargaining. For simplicity we assume that union-




















where disagreement points are rV U and 0 for union members and ﬁrms, respectively. The ﬁrst order conditions for
wage and employment are given by:







w = βPi (Hi)A +
ξ − 1
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Together, equations (35) and (36) describe partial equilibrium employment and wages. Real proﬁts per worker are














To solve for short run general equilibrium, once again impose that the individual prices sum to equal the price index




























To ﬁnd the long run equilibrium with endogenous industry size, compute ﬁrm level proﬁts according to ( 27) and ﬁnd
the proﬁt level that equals annuitized entry costs. If we compare (38) to the equilibrium condition for efﬁcient bar-
gaining (23) we observe that the ﬁrst ratio is here not diminished by β. This comes from the absence of the overhiring
effect with efﬁcient bargaining and implies that under an efﬁcient bargaining mechanism for wage determination,
equilibrium labor market tightness is unambiguously decreasing in union bargaining power β.
Whereas monopolistic competition typically suggests that output is too low, the results of Stole and Zwiebel
(1996) suggest that ﬁrms that face decreasing marginal revenue product will overhire under individual bargaining.
Under efﬁcient bargaining, we would expect that the overhiring effect will be absent. This indeed turns out to be the
case. In the bottom left panel of ﬁgure 10 we see that as intra-industry competition increases the unemployment rate
falls. For efﬁcient bargaining the impact is quite dramatic at any level of competition, for individual bargaining the
equilibrium unemployment rate is not much affected after the number of ﬁrms per sector has exceeded 4. For any
calibration, ﬁrm size with individual bargainingis strictly decreasing in competition, while for efﬁcient bargainingwe
notice in the top left panel that ﬁrm size initially increases in competition and then drops. Finally in the bottom right
panel of ﬁgure 10 we see that output increases much stronger in competition with efﬁcient bargaining. We interpret
this as evidence that the overhiringmentioned by Stole and Zwiebel (1996) actually counteracts the ‘underproduction’
typically found in monopolistic competition. In the next subsection we explore in more detail how the decentralized
and the efﬁcient bargaining regime affect social efﬁciency.
6.4 Social Efﬁciency
We now comparethe distribution of monopolyrents in economieswith centralizedunionbargaining(efﬁcientbargain-
ing), and decentralized bargaining at the individual worker level. This is important from a welfare point of view. Any
setup where ﬁrms take their productmarket power into account will lead to underprovisionof goods. At the same time
ﬁrms in individual bargaining settings have an incentive to overhire and thus overproduce (Stole and Zwiebel, 1996)
18which can potentially counteract some of the monopoly distortions. Such a ‘self-regulation’ is absent in the efﬁcient
bargaining setup.
The main questions we ask here are:
1. Is the standard Hosios (1990) condition still relevant in a setting with monopolistic competition?
2. Is it possible to make welfare statements aboutallocativeoutcomesusingdecentralizedandefﬁcient bargaining?
3. Is aggregate employment too low or too high or is it ambiguous?
4. Doesthe‘overhiring’thatis implicitinthedecentralizedapproachmakeupforsomeofthemonopolydistortion?
We have previously chosen a linear production function, so it was only the downward sloping demand function
that determined optimal size of ﬁrms15. For the social planner economy we thus face indeterminate ﬁrm size and
will simply consider industry-wide employment. Further, since all ﬁrms have identical technologies, all ﬁrms are
identical. Thus total output of the economy can simply be written as AH(1 − u) where H is aggregate employment.
Furthermore,given that all goods enter the utility function symmetrically they will be consumed in equal amounts and
per capita consumption of the aggregate good is thus given by A(1 − u).
Vacancyposting costs are linearin vacancies. Using our deﬁnitionof labormarket tightness we can write economy
wide per-period vacancy posting costs as ΦV θu so that the per period social welfare function becomes A(1 − u) −
ΦV θu.
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for all t (39)
where η denotes the elasticity of the matching function with respect to θ, i.e. η =
θq
 (θ)
q(θ) . Combining the ﬁrst order
conditions for θt and ut+1, using the envelope condition and imposing the steady state condition that θ t = θ and












6.4.1 Conditions for Social Efﬁciency
By comparing (40) to the equilibrium condition of individualized bargaining in (23) we ﬁnd two necessary condition
for social efﬁciency:
15Hiring costs are linear in vacancies.
191. β = −η which is just the standard Hosios condition;
2.
ξ−β
ξ−1 =1which comes from the monopoly distortion. As ξ →∞the distortion disappears, as expected.
Thisimpliesthatif theHosiosconditionholdsthemonopolydistortioncouldbeeliminatedbygivingall bargaining
power to the workers. This is an interesting angle because one intuition for the Hosios condition is that general wage-
setting leaves out the unemployed. If wages were chosen by currently unemployed, the matching inefﬁciency would
disappear.
6.4.2 Unemployment too high or low?
The RHS of both the socially efﬁcient equilibrium condition (40) and its individual bargaining counterpart (23) are
increasing in θ, β, and −η. We can infer that for −η<βunemployment is clearly above the socially efﬁcient level.
This is composed of two effects, the trading externality and the monopoly distortion. The monopoly distortion (mani-
fested by
ξ−β
ξ−1) always implies underemployment. For −η<βthe trading externality also implies underemployment
and thus unemployment is unambiguously too high in the decentralized solution. This is the case for our benchmark
parameterization where β =0 .3 > −η =0 .25.
However, for −η>βthe trading externality implies overemployment whereas the monopoly distortion still
suggests underemployment. Given that the two distortions work in opposite directions it is not clear, whether the level
of unemployment will be too low or too high in the decentralized equilibrium as compared to the socially efﬁcient
outcome.
Notice that for simplicity we have ignored unemployment beneﬁts b for these comparisons. However, they can
be included rather easily. There is no effect on the social planner equilibrium condition because total consumption is
still determined by aggregate production. However, in the decentralized solution b will increase the RHS of ( 23) and
thus lead to more unemploymentand fewer vacancies than otherwise. This is obvious because with risk neutral agents
there is simply no role for unemployment insurance.
7 Conclusions
Themain objectiveofthis paperhas beentostudythe relationshipbetweenproductmarketregulationandlabormarket
outcomes. Our main contribution is twofold. First, we develop a dynamic model with search frictions, multi-worker
ﬁrms and imperfect competition, which is suitable for quantitative analysis. We then use our model to answer two
quantitative questions: (1) What is the impact of increasing product-market competition on equilibrium employment
and wages? and (2) By how much would lowering barriers to entry reduce European unemployment?
Our answer to the ﬁrst question is clear and simple: a little bit of competition goes a long way. We ﬁnd that
moving from an economy populated by monopolists to one with ﬁve competitors per industry leads to a decrease in
unemploymentof more than 30%, accompanied by a doubling of real wages. Our answer to the second question turns
out to depend crucially on ﬁrm lifespans and/or survival rates. When ﬁrms are inﬁnitely-lived, entry costs may be
20amortized over an extended period, keeping entry proﬁtable even at low levels of per-periodproﬁt. Hence, when ﬁrms
are long-lived, both continental European and Anglo-American entry cost regimes lead to very large industry sizes,
leaving little room for improved labor market performance. When, however, ﬁrms face shorter horizons or less-than
perfectsurvivalrates, then Europeanindustrysizes may becomeas low as 1.3, comparedto industrysizes of morethan
20 under the Anglo-Americanregime. This would imply a drop in equilibrium unemploymentof fully two percentage
points, from 6.3% to 4.3%. The crucial role that ﬁrm lifespan plays for our second set of quantitative phenomena
motivates future research on endogenizing the ﬁrm lifespan.
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24A Bargaining in the Large Firm
Here we discuss the bargainingfoundationof our (individual) wage curve. Start out with only one worker. We assume
that the bargaining weight is 1/2, i.e. ﬁrms and workers split surplus equally. This implies that that the surplus to the
ﬁrm must equal the surplus that goes to the worker. In the lines below the surplus to the ﬁrms is on the LHS and the
surplus to the worker is on the RHS. By w I denote the reservation wage.
One worker:




















Here the ﬁrm can now sell 2 items at price P2 but of course cannot sell the one item at (higher) price P1. Similarly for
the wages. On the other hand each worker now receives w(2).
Three workers:
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Note that the coefﬁcients of the Pi sum up to 1/2. We can now generalize the expression to N and notice that the



















This is very similar to the presentation in Stole and Zwiebel (1996). There the driving force is a decreasing marginal
product to labor, while here it is the downward sloping demand curve.





























which is the analogon to equation (15) from the text with β =1 /2, Ai =1 , and Φ=0 .
25B Tables
Table 1: Baseline Parameters
σ 1.5; 3; 5 Substitution elasticity
¯ A 1 Average level of labor productivity
β 0.2; 0.5 Worker bargaining power
b 0.3; 0.1; 0.5 Real unemployment beneﬁts
θ 4/100 Labor market tightness
Φ 5 Real vacancy posting cost
r 0.04/12 Annual interest rate
χ 1/80 Average tenure of seven years!
η 0.25 Elasticity of the matching function
26Table 2: European vs. Anglo-American Barriers to Entry
Days % of p.c. GDP Days % of p.c. GDP
Country df Country df
Austria 154 0.45 Canada 2 0.01
Belgium 42 0.10 Ireland 25 0.11
France 66 0.20 United Kingdom 11 0.01






Euro Average 88 0.17 Anglo Average 7 0.01
Table 3: Firm-Survival and Equilibrium Labor Market Outcomes
pSurv nEuro nAnglo uEuro uAnglo ∆u wEuro wAnglo ∆w
0.95 1.3 >20 6.35 4.28 -32 % 0.68 0.88 +29 %
0.96 1.6 >20 5.70 4.28 -25 % 0.73 0.88 +21.%
0.97 2.2 >20 5.18 4.28 -17 % 0.77 0.88 +14 %
0.98 3.3 >20 4.75 4.28 -10 % 0.82 0.88 +7 %
0.99 8.0 >20 4.41 4.28 - 3 % 0.86 0.88 +2 %
1.00 >20 >20 4.28 4.28 0 % 0.88 0.88 0 %
27C Figures












































































Figure 1: Barriers to Entry in Europe and North America.


















Figure 2: Partial Equilibrium.
























































































































Figure 3: Competition and Labor Markets – Baseline Calibration.





















































































































Figure 4: Competition and Labor Markets – σ =3 .





















































































































Figure 5: Competition and Labor Markets – b =0 .4.























































































































Figure 6: Competition and Labor Markets – b =0 .2.





















































































































Figure 7: Competition and Labor Markets – β =0 .5.























































































































Figure 8: Competition and Labor Markets – σ =3and b =0 .4.







































Figure 9: Long-Term General Equilibrium – Endogenous Industry Size












































































Figure 10: Comparing Decentralzied and Efﬁcient Bargaining.
























































































































Figure 11: σ–Competition: Baseline Calibration.
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